Thursday, May 28, 2009

危機感

1. 五月二十五同五月二十六日,五月16600 put 分別有498同437張long倉開左。琴日嘅升市話比大家知,淨係呢935張option己經蝕左太約935*50*1000 = 四億六千幾萬,即係大戶同大戶鬥,無散戶份。財富轉移急速進行中。

2. 滙控減存款息,似擺款多過想為盈利;hibor創新低;銀行結餘成二千五百幾億;各大行轉軚睇好樓、股等實物資產;游資充斥市場;各人焦點由通縮轉為通脹;一切一切都暗示--->資金市,令到樓、股、商品等實物資產作出非理性嘅上升:
a) 恒指係短短三個月由113xx升到琴日嘅178xx,升左6500點,幅度達57.5%!
b) 地產商嘅新樓盤買過滿紅,今朝睇新聞,新開盤位於馬鞍山嘅銀湖.天峰一晚售出400個單位!

越多呢類消息,我嘅危機感就越強:
1. 樓市一般都係滯後指標,但目前經濟未回穩,點解會同經濟decouple?
2. 非理性嘅升市(但唔係話乜經濟差,股市點會好嘅「阿媽係女人」理論),可以睇以下幅圖,



同07年直通車概念比,白色線嘅斜度同由今年三月到而家為止嘅斜度居然係平衡,可以話今次升得同個次一樣:升到你唔信,亦都唔比你追得到;試問有幾多散仔係今次升浪食盡?
3. 有些常看嘅blogger 都開始相繼停手、又或者出下貨、再唔係就做hedging!

呢排腦入邊諗緊d嘢,但係出唔到結論:
1. 美國嘅意圖:又想美元貶值嚟撐住出口,又想強美元嚟搵水魚食佢d債
2. decouple:上次97亞洲金融風暴,亞洲國家受傷極深,但西方國家繼續繁榮;今次西方國家受難,亞洲國家相對只係輕傷,會唔會出現economy decouple?但係亞洲國家經濟係連繫住西方國家,主人有難,做下人(雖難聽,但係事實)嘅會唔會無糧出?靠自己夠唔夠食?
3. 中國經濟真空期:三頭車馬,兩頭(出口、固投)死火,剩下一頭(內需),撐唔撐得起中國需要嘅經濟增長幅度?四萬億資金夠唔夠呢?中國係可以再加碼,但到唔到位呢?到呢一刻為止,中國政府嘅資金都係落係大國企身上,相反主導經濟發展嘅中、小企業仍然係水深火熱中,二元經濟幾時好呢?
4. 香港嘅前途:四大行業得翻金融可以講有優勢,但一連串嘅醜聞(迷債、私有化)將呢個優勢打左個折,若再不思進取(又唔搞好債券市,迷於衍生市),又玩特別嘢(伊斯蘭bond、商品),可以大膽預言,莫講話上海,星加玻都可以威過你!
5. 資金嘅出路:港幣可以講遲早會unpack美元,到左rmb滙兌自由,港幣可以消失,而家購買力不斷下降嘅情況之下,想安全保護購買力,應該點做?

Saturday, May 23, 2009

咁都得?

考完試可以當份考試成績無到,咁考嚟做乜呢?

Sunday, May 17, 2009

魔鬼在細節中

美國首季非農業生產力以年率計升 0.8%,勞工成本增 3.3%

美國 4月份失業率微增 0.4個百分點至 8.9%,為 1983年 9月以來最高,期內非農業職位減少 53.9萬個,是半年來最低,亦少於預期的 60萬個,主要因美國人口普查局為應付 10年一次的人口普查,上月共招聘 14萬名臨時員工。至於 3月份批發庫存則跌 1.6%,遜預期。


由上面條link話比我地知,除左上面所講嘅臨時職位,原來放棄搵工嘅人比3月係多左,所以失業率先附合預期,唔知若果唔計上述兩項會點呢?

再睇length of unemployment 呢項,平均都有成21個月係無嘢做,中位數都有成一年有多。

根據wiki,原來美國失業係分幾層

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics

Unemployment rate for US states in 2004

The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures employment and unemployment (of those over 15 years of age) using two different labor force surveys[28]conducted by the United States Census Bureau (within the United States Department of Commerce) and/or the Bureau of Labor Statistics (within theUnited States Department of Labor) that gather employment statistics monthly. The Current Population Survey (CPS), or "Household Survey", conducts a survey based on a sample of 60,000 households. This Survey measures the unemployment rate based on the ILO definition.[29] The data is also used to calculate 5 alternate measures of unemployment as a percentage of the labor force based on different definitions noted as U1 through U6:[30]

  • U1: Percentage of labor force unemployed 15 weeks or longer.
  • U2: Percentage of labor force who lost jobs or completed temporary work.
  • U3: Official unemployment rate per ILO definition.
  • U4: U3 + "discouraged workers", or those who have stopped looking for work because current economic conditions make them believe that no work is available for them.
  • U5: U4 + other "marginally attached workers", or those who "would like" and are able to work, but have not looked for work recently.
  • U6: U5 + Part time workers who want to work full time, but can not due to economic reasons.
再睇埋呢個pdf

唔知大家對於美國嘅失業情況有無佢公報咁好呢?

至於非農生產力,上升嘅原因係hours worked dropping 9% and output only dropping 8.2% (poof, productivity gains!).明未?

都係個句啦,魔鬼在細節中!

升升升



06/05/2009 恒指16834.57
30/04/2009 恒指 15520.99

四個交易日升左1314點。由上星期開始,一直都上演緊殺熊記,而熊仔更加好似殺不死咁,不斷咁上推,最肥個隻係18300,係唔係要殺盡呢?

唔知點解,呢次好有直通車feel,每日新聞係升、升、升,究竟歷史會唔會重覆呢,定係「今次點同個次」呢?

待續......

自問,我唔係讀經濟,亦都無去修經濟學科嘅課程,所以係度所講嘅都係自己係呢兩年嚟睇書、經評、雜誌所得嘅一點個人睇法,有人可能覺得好幼稚,亦都有人覺得都係一般嘅評論,無乜特別。我無相干,因為都係個人記錄,第時睇翻(若果YAHOO無摺嘅話)可能會取笑自己以前嘅諗法係咁NAVIE。

續上一PART,恒指又到去172XX,短短兩個月就升左大約50%,令我不期然諗起直通車個次!由8月20日嘅21595升到11月1日嘅31492,都係升左大約50%,時間呢?用左54個交易日,又或者大約10個星期;到琴日為止,用左42日﹐又或者9個星期,原來今次更加瘋狂。今次究竟炒D乜嘢呢?發達國GDP倒退,發展中國家GDP減速,中國都話要保八,諗真D可能係炒RECOVER。一般股市會行先經濟六到九個月,若果市場係嚟真嘅,咁即係今年年尾到下年第一季初經濟會RECOVER,得咩?

負面因素:
1.同過往經濟衰退不同之處係今次中招係銀行系統。經濟就如一個人嘅身體結構咁,銀行係擔當心臓去提供養份($$)去比其他器官(各行各業)運作,若果無血液PUMP到各功能器官,都係等死居多。就係因為咁,一日銀行未好翻,又何來RECOVER呢?
2.全球一體化令到一國嘅危機會向外擴散,你睇歐洲仲差過源頭---美國就知!
3.好多人話中國/發展中國家會DE-COUPLE,部份啦。以出口為主導嘅發展中國家,若無左西方嘅消費力去支持,唔死都一身傷啦!內需?唔係今日講,聽日做到,始終需要時間去轉型,過多幾年先啦!

正面因素:
1.前所未有嘅資金係咁PUMP入市場。
2.雷曼之後,各國都加上自己嘅有形之手去干預市場,想做到人為修正。
3.各國經濟指標都有穩定及轉好跡象。
4.信貸市場解凍 --- 血液流通

究竟係市場力量大定係政府彎都搞到直呢?

有個比喻幾好,股市係狗,經濟係主人,而家隻狗跑快左,而主人仲留喺個氹入邊,半邊身都未出哂,隻狗去得幾遠?條狗繩幾長都好,始終佢都要返翻去主人身邊,唯一希望嘅係返到主人身邊時,主人已經離開左個氹啦!

Friday, May 01, 2009

美股點睇(2)


上圖可以睇到d乜?一支大陽蠋隨後收陰蠋,之後個日係陰蠋,大定細決定係當日嘅成交量!咁今晚會點,聽日咪知lor!始終太少數據,唔可以太武斷。

再睇翻前一篇,係基本型勢上,美國經濟可以話相反於上一牛仔誕生之時,最主要係deleveraging 呢個行動並無跡象顯示會減少,個人儲蓄都仲係上升勢頭,而負債佔個人/政府嘅資產比例都奇高,以超過七成消費為經濟增長動力嘅美國又點可以係減債期仲可以推高消費,從而ignite翻個經濟,所以曹仁超話美國經濟L型係唔錯得去邊!

而家美國(其實全球都係除左歐盟)都不斷pump水入去實體經濟,可惜嘅係:
1. 個氹好似填極都唔到頂咁
2. 各國嘅資金傾斜係某一面(美國係金融,中國係國企),發展不平衡。

不過,正如zero hedge 個篇嘢話,唔係無賺錢機會,只不過要比多d心機,都會有double money. 股市從來都係喺一個不穩定、不明朗嘅情況下先會有不理性嘅表現,到一切塵埃落定,己到左牛三啦,入去咪叫做玩鬥傻游戲lor。

p.s. 重post  一幅圖


A)  S&P lowest 683 in 5/3/2009
       now 873, +27.8%

B)  Dow Jones lowest 6547 in 9/3/2009
      now 8168, +24.76%

C   NasDaq lowest 1268 in 9/3/2009
      now 1717, +35.41%

嚟緊會點,即管睇下係唔係sell in may and go away

美股點睇(1)

http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/04/comparing-todays-vegas-back-lot-to-real.html

Zero Hedge has often been critical of the administration's current policies, which are not unique or novel, or even sufficient, as many claim, to prevent a relapse based on a confluence of economic events that pushed the country into the Great Depression, and can be simply qualified as inflationary spending and credit bubble reflation. By peddling debt at even cheaper rates than the much maligned Greenspan did during the great initial credit bubble inflation, what is happening right now does not differ one bit from the scenario that brought us here. Attempting to set the basis for a true bull market by Obama would look totally different, most notably the elimination of massive amounts of debt to the pain of existing equity holders. Of course, that would never happen as those very equity holders are the bulk of his voting constituency and what politician cares about doing the right thing instead of getting reelected? But that is not news to anyone.

What would, however be newsworthy, is a comparison of the current market which has at this point become a speculative day trading casino, with the one, which in the early 1980s lead to a multi generational bull market, however ultimately fed by the same credit binge that has led us to our current predicament. For that purpose i present a great analysis done by highly insightful and contrarian folks over at contrary investor. The observations are stunning.

***

You already know that since “the bottom” in the equity market back in early March, the cries have grown ever louder with each passing point higher on the major equity averages that a major stock market bottom has been reached and a key turn in the economy is at hand as many an economic stat of the moment shows stabilization in rate of change deterioration for now. Moreover, we’ve seen a number of stock market extremes in recent months that we have to admit are generational in nature.

Has a major inflection point on the downside been achieved? It’s been a very long time since we’ve done a little compare and contrast with major economic and equity market lows in the annals of historical experience. You already know that the prior true market and economic bottom of substance was seen in the early 1980’s. Prior to that the next secular low we really trace back to 1949. From 1949 through 1966 the markets enjoyed one heck of a bull run. And then it was really a “running in place” exercise for equities in the macro sense until 1982, with a lot of tradable up and down volatility along the way, but no point-to-point progress from 1966 to 1982. That’s our version of life as we survey history. So we thought we’d look back at some data for a little compare and contrast as no one really knows the answer to the question as to whether the equity market and economy have been or are bottoming at the moment . Everyone is guessing. We’ll only know for sure in hindsight.

We believe the important point of this exercise is not pinpoint data comparison with a prior and in hindsight clearly identifiable market and economic cycle low, but rather a total package look at life. True economic and market lows are made up of a multiplicity of factors all coming together at once to set the infrastructural stage necessary for a real domestic/world economic and equity new bull market recovery. In the following table we take a quick peek back at the prior now oh so clear secular 1982 bottom. We’d also look at the major 1949 low, but most of the Fed data we used in the table below simply does not stretch that far back. We divide up the data retrospective into credit market numbers, household financial character circumstances, headline interest rate and inflation factors and very generic equity market markers. Have a look and we’ll have a few comments.



We won’t dwell on the credit market stats as the dichotomous compare and contrast exercise is virtually self-explanatory. As we have harped on in the past, US credit cycle dynamics since the early 1980’s has been responsible for and underpinned corporate earnings growth, GDP expansion and asset value inflation. Back in the early 1980’s, the US economy as a whole was nowhere near as levered as we now experience. The secular rise in interest rates from the 1950’s to the crescendo in the early 1980’s made debt quite the expensive luxury, or necessity as the case may be. But secular disinflation and the coincident fall in cost of debt capital over close to the last thirty years allowed the US economy to lever up significantly. Can a bull economy really start from this level of current leverage? And of course the question of a bull economy has direct implications for an accompanying bull in macro equities. US systemic leverage circumstances today are night and day compared to what we saw in the early 1980’s. The dynamics of peaking cost of debt capital accompanied by a reasonably levered at the time US economy was the critical infrastructure in place at the time that was the breeding ground for one of the longest economic and equity bull market cycles in history. Today circumstances stand in polar contrast. Cost of debt now stands at generational lows and systemic leverage at generational highs. We humbly suggest that the leverage and credit market infrastructure is not currently in place to support a secular low in equities and the economy. It seems only common sense that from our current circumstances, secular change in leverage should fall and long term cost of debt capital should rise. Exactly the opposite of secular environmental circumstances of 1982.

US households have been a key driver of the multi-decade US credit cycle. Again, circumstances of the moment are completely different than was seen at the last secular low of substance. As a very quick and powerful note, we need to remember that in early 1982, US households held very little in the way of equities. Today you can see the number stands at 17 % of household net worth, but we have to remember this is down from 25% a few years ago as a result of market value contraction since that time. Moreover, this number does not include IRA’s, 401(k)’s, etc. The baby boom generation has been the generation of equity ownership, starting with very little exposure to now significant exposure (inclusive of the qualified plan money). This will not repeat itself again and was a key demand driver of the last three decades.

Interest rates and inflation? Fed interest rate flexibility has been used in its entirety. In 1982, vast flexibility was in the hands of the Fed in terms of being able to shape economic and financial market outcomes vis-à-vis monetary policy. No more and never again anytime soon. For all intents and purposes, headline inflation has been completely rung out of the system…for now. All of the potential for lowering interest rates and riding a powerful wave of disinflation wildly supportive to real economies and financial markets (including valuations) is behind us, not in front of us.

Finally, we’ve used the Bob Shiller historical S&P P/E data as valuation markers for equities in this little compare and contrast exercise. S&P yields have been climbing as of late, but from very low points in prior years. Moreover, clearly getting in the way here has been meaningful dividend cuts or outright elimination over the last year. This is not about to stop any time soon. Point being, we’re on our way, but at nowhere near equity character secular lows of historical note. Simple enough. Likewise, although P/E multiples are now very low relative to recent period experience, this assumes earnings trough now, which is not necessarily a given. You can also see that Shiller P/E numbers even after the already in place contraction are twice what was seen at the secular lows of 1982, not that these secular low P/E's are a prerequisite for bull markets, but they sure do help in terms of framing potential risk/reward outcomes.

Okay, enough. Is the world about to come to an end because of the apparent data point dichotomies you see in the table? Of course not. Do these numbers mandate equities are to “bleed out” ahead? In no way. But what they do tell us is that the necessary total package infrastructure is not in place to support what could be defined as secular low points for the equity market or the real economy. That says to us that as we move forward, caution, sector, and asset class specific focus remains critical. Simply, we do not believe we are in an environment like the early 1980’s where the secular tide to come is about to lift all boats. That’s all. Not good nor bad, simply the context against which we need to make decisions. We just need to understand and “see” the character of the investment playing field in front of us. Simply, it's not the same playing field we saw in 1982. One last comment that is surely obvious. What does make the current environment critically different than 1982 is the stimulus now being supplied primarily to the financial sector and credit markets, a minor part of which is direct economic stimulus. We are in uncharted waters as far as US debt acceleration, money printing and forward financial guarantees are concerned. Of course what we are talking about above is the nuts and bolts credit market and macro financial circumstances of the moment. It's against the polarity of the here and now stimulus will either succeed or fail.

Before pushing on, one quick chart. There exists yet another differential we believe is key to our present circumstances in light of the fact that the US will need to issue very substantial Treasury debt ahead. The following chart needs very little explanation, no?




We didn’t think so. With each passing year, the US economy has increasingly been “financed” by the foreign community since 1982. Will this continue ahead? We currently stand in quite the contrast to 1982 as far as the US financing its economy goes. Quite the contrast.

There you have it. In case you were wondering, we’ll spell it out for you. Personally we do not believe the infrastructure components are currently in place to support a new secular bull market, despite the S&P and equity index friends essentially going nowhere point-to-point over the last decade. But that certainly does not mean there are no investment opportunities. Quite the opposite. What these numbers tell us is that a reconciliatory period for the US will probably extend for years, meaning volatility will be a fact of life. Secondly, we simply need to think and act differently ahead relative to correct behavior in the secular equity and economic bull of the 1982 period to date. The context of the global is the reference point from which we need to work. Circumstances today are different than the prior equity and economic secular lows. Not bad at all, but different. This is the very thinking which will shape our actions ahead.

http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/04/comparing-todays-vegas-back-lot-to-real.html
 
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